SnowFlurry 9 2016/17 | Avalanche accidents: Homo homini lupus or the wolf in sheep's clothing?

The snow pusher is currently enjoying his time at school immensely. Before you google this more or less well-known quote: "Homo homini lupus" means "Man is man's wolf" and is often translated more freely as "Man's greatest enemy is man himself". The phrase became acceptable in the 17th century in Thomas Hobbes' relatively well-known theory of the state "Leviathan". If we apply this statement to the snowpack and avalanches, the question arises as to who is "to blame" for avalanche accidents - man himself or the unpredictable snowpack? Ski pioneer Mathias Zdarsky labeled the latter at the beginning of the 20th century as "The so innocent white snow is not a wolf in sheep's clothing, but a tiger in lambskin". The answer is naturally not particularly simple. So let's go on a search for clues.

Status quo - here's how it looks

There are avalanche situations where the assessment is very easy: the hazard potential is relatively low and there are hardly any warning signs in nature, triggering an avalanche due to additional human activity is unlikely. Typically only found in the "low" danger level. Then there are situations where the danger potential is very high and you are well warned by the influence of wind, settling noises, spontaneous avalanches, for example - usually even instilled with fear and restraint. The additional load of a person can also be decisive, but the snowpack is so unstable that it already generates avalanches on its own - typically for the sportsman at a danger level "considerable" in the upper range (3) and a danger level "great" (4). And then there is everything in between. The situations where exactly the additional load of an athlete is enough to trigger avalanches remain the most difficult to assess in terms of their spatial and temporal distribution. It can issue relatively extensive warnings, obvious or hidden warnings or practically no warnings at all (Oh, old snow, oh old snow!). However, it is most common in high winter: Summarized in the danger levels "moderate" (2) and "considerable" (3). It is not everywhere or mostly dangerous, but also not everywhere safe. With these danger levels, the distribution of the danger areas is even more important. The graphic is taken from the learning portal at https://www.avalanche.ca/cherry-bowl/ and summarizes the whole thing well.

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Mea culpa - my fault?

The framework conditions are therefore decisive - as always. Added to this are the human factors such as group dynamics, today is not my day, powder lust, ... and thus make it almost impossible to answer the question of guilt. Since, as a rule, none of those apportioning blame have ever been there themselves and can therefore only grasp parts of the overall situation, apportioning blame is actually out of place and doesn't help anyone. On the other hand, it makes sense to think about your own "part of the blame": what could I (as a survivor) have done better? What did I overlook? Why did I overlook it?

Some accidents are due to a chain of unfortunate circumstances, while others cannot be prevented even with good expertise. After all, we only ever calculate with probabilities when it comes to avalanches. Some of the accidents could be prevented if you raise your ability to assess the probability of avalanches occurring to a higher level - or reduce your willingness to take risks. This also includes trusting those who deal with the situation on a daily basis and whose ability to assess the probability of avalanches occurring is several spheres above that of the average sportsperson - the avalanche warnings.

Exempla - examples

The wolf in sheep's clothing on 06.02.2013

The Tyrolean avalanche situation report reads: "The avalanche danger in the Tyrolean touring areas is to be classified as considerable above around 2000m. The main danger continues to come from the constantly forming new accumulations of drift snow. These are usually brittle and poorly bonded to the loose fresh snow below, making them relatively easy to trigger as an avalanche. [...] Danger spots are located in drift snow slopes and in terrain close to the crest in all exposures, with the number and distribution of danger spots increasing with altitude. As drift snow packs are now often covered by fresh snow, they are difficult to recognize in the terrain. Ski tours and off-piste skiing require experience in assessing the avalanche situation."

The situation in the Northern Stubai Alps was perfect for a wolf in sheep's clothing: 20cm of calm, loose fresh snow hid extensive, easily triggered drift snow packs underneath. But pictures speak more than a thousand words. Even with experience, it is almost impossible to recognize the hidden drift snow packs, defensive tour selection - i.e. avoiding the large-scale problem areas - takes precedence over avoiding the slope or terrain itself - i.e. the small-scale problem areas.

Homo homini lupus

Exactly three years later on 06.02.2016

Situation report from Tyrol: "The avalanche danger has decreased somewhat due to the rise in temperature and is often considerable above about 2300m, moderate below, low below the tree line. [...] Weak layers close to the ground are more difficult to assess. This is increasingly conceivable above about 2300m in shady terrain, above about 2500m also on sunny slopes. Inner alpine regions such as the Ötzal, Stubai, Tux and Zillertal Alps are more frequently affected than the other regions. You should be particularly careful in areas with little snow, where triggering is most likely."

On this day, almost the entire north-facing basin in the Wattener Lizum below the Geier (Tux Alps) at an altitude of 2300m to 2700m was triggered by two groups as a snow slab and several people lost their lives. The problem was known and could be localized. So what human factors were responsible? Snow profiles were created by the group on the accident slope beforehand, and the situation report was presumably studied together. Was it misinterpreted knowledge or experience? The pressure on the tour leaders? Ignoring warnings? Or, or, or?

In dubio pro reo - In case of doubt for the accused

The energy of apportioning blame is better invested in prevention work. Considering the overall safety efforts in mountain sports, a great deal of effort is already being put into the prevention of avalanche accidents. Why is it worth investing more here? The answer to this question is simple: people still die in avalanches where the danger would have been relatively easy to recognize. You can't undo an accident and you can't bring a dead person back to life.

Loose snow avalanches suggest snowpack-free snow conditions, 06.02.2013

Lukas Ruetz

Rietzer Grieskogel

No convicted mountain guide or tour leader brings their dead guest back to their family. It is also impossible to determine in absolute terms how many lives have already been saved through prevention work. But the number of avalanche deaths per season in the Alps has remained roughly the same for years - with a simultaneous sharp rise in the number of athletes and an increasing number of days spent in unsecured ski areas. And not only on modern routes but also in less frequented and extreme terrain. If this trend continues, a constant number of avalanche victims can still be considered a "success" - the snow pusher throws into the room: the next goal should be to slowly reduce the number of avalanche victims while at the same time slightly increasing or stagnating the number of touring days. A halving is perhaps within the realms of possibility - viewed on average, not on an individual winter basis. The greatest potential currently lies in those accidents where the dangers - even with little experience or knowledge - send out recognizable warnings or where following the instructions in the situation report and thus avoiding certain exposures and altitudes or individual days without unsecured terrain are already enough.

In this sense: Yes, the so innocent, white snow can be a wolf in sheep's clothing - in other conditions, however, man is man's wolf.

Notare: Non scholae sed vitae discimus - or in mountain terms: a course or training is not enough, you have to develop yourself and engage with the subject matter in order to learn enough to survive. Even the highest quality training such as a mountain and ski guide is not enough and can only provide a broader basis. There are avalanche situations that are relatively easy to assess and situations that are difficult to assess and require defensive behavior.

Have an accident-free 2017! Take care of yourselves.

Thanks to Patrick W. for the impetus for the article.